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Two Heads Are Less Bubbly than One: 
Team Decision-Making in an Experimental Asset Market
* 
 
We study the effect of team decision-making on bubbles and crashes in experimental asset 
markets of the kind introduced by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). We find that 
populating such markets with teams of size two instead of individuals significantly reduces 
the severity of mispricing. In particular we observe that under our teams treatment, deviations 
in prices away from intrinsic value are significantly smaller in magnitude, shorter in duration 
and associated with lower volume and price volatility. We also find an unexpected gender 
effect in team composition, manifesting itself in more extreme – though not consistently more 
profitable – behaviour by all-male teams. Since these effects are not observed among male 
participants generally, we conjecture that they may be due to factors specific to the 
psychology of decision-making in male-dominated environments. 
 
Non-Technical Summary: 
Many important decisions in both business and government are increasingly being entrusted 
to small groups as opposed to individuals. Yet economics has remained largely silent on the 
question of group decision-making, treating the decisions of households and firms as though 
they were made by unitary decision-makers. This paper uses an experimental asset market 
to investigate whether trading by teams of size two is less likely to generate market bubbles 
and crashes. The main result is that bubbles are indeed diminished under team decision-
making. In addition, the gender composition of teams has surprising effects upon their 
performance, with all-male teams adopting more extreme – though not necessarily more 
profitable – positions.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Financial markets have long been known to exhibit price swings that are difficult to reconcile 
with fundamental values. Price bubbles and crashes have been documented since the Dutch 
tulip bubble of 1637, and have come back into prominence following recent developments in 
global financial markets. Since the seminal paper by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), 
hereinafter SSW, the bubble and crash phenomenon has also been extensively studied in the 
experimental laboratory. 
To date, this research has focused on the behaviour of experimental markets populated by 
individuals.  However,  many  important  decisions  in  both  business  and  government  – 
including funds management (Baer, Kempf and Ruenzi 2005) and monetary policy (Blinder 
and  Morgan  2005)  –  are  increasingly  being  entrusted  to  small  groups  as  opposed  to 
individuals. Yet, with the exception of the fields of public choice and organisation theory, 
economics has remained largely silent on the question of group decision making, treating the 
decisions of households and firms as though they were made by unitary decision makers. 
In this paper, we adopt the SSW design to investigate whether teams of size two are less 
susceptible to trading at prices considerably at variance from intrinsic value. In so doing, we 
set out to make two distinct contributions. Firstly, whereas almost all existing literature on 
experimental  asset  markets  has  examined  the  robustness  of  bubbles  and  crashes  to 
institutional  features  of  the  market  environment,  our  focus  in  this  paper  is  on  the 
characteristics of the traders themselves, in particular the effect of populating a market with 
teams instead of individuals. Secondly, we contribute to research on teams by reporting, to 
the best of our knowledge, the first experimental study of team behaviour in a continuous 
time market environment. 
Across a full spectrum of measures of the severity of mispricing in a market, we find that our 
teams  treatment  results  in  significantly  smaller  price  bubbles  than  those  that  have  been 
documented for most conventional treatment designs. This holds both relative to a set of 
baseline sessions and to a database of observations compiled from the literature as a whole. It 
also emerges from our results that the gender composition of teams has a substantial bearing 
upon their behaviour and performance in the market, with particularly striking differences 
observed  comparing  all male  teams  to  mixed gender  and  all female  teams.  These  results 3 
regarding gender effects within teams are in line with findings from the psychology literature, 
but are novel to experimental economics and studies of asset markets. 
2.  REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Our  study  is  intended  to  contribute  to  two  distinct  bodies  of  research  in  experimental 
economics. The first is the literature on price bubbles in experimental asset markets, which is 
reviewed in Section 2.1. The second body of research, on behavioural differences in decision 
making between individuals and teams, is reviewed in Section 2.2. Finally, it emerges from 
our  results  that  the  gender  composition  of  teams  has  a  substantial  bearing  upon  their 
behaviour  and  performance  in  our  experiment.  Accordingly,  Section  2.3  briefly  reviews 
relevant research on gender differences, including in the context of team decision making. 
2.1.  Price Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets 
A  bubble  in  asset  prices  has  been  defined  as  ‘trade  in  high  volume  at  prices  that  are 
considerably at variance from intrinsic value’ (King et al 1993, p. 183). Such mispricing in 
asset  markets  can  lead  to  severe  distortions  to  the  allocation  of  capital,  with  potentially 
adverse  repercussions  for  the  wider  economy,  as  illustrated  for  example  by  the  ongoing 
fallout from the bursting of the United States housing price bubble in the period since 2006. 
Whereas in a field setting the true value of an asset is typically impossible to determine, in an 
experimental  market  the  intrinsic  value  is  under  the  control  of  the  experimenter.  The 
tendency for experimental asset markets to bubble and crash, even when information on the 
dividend process is common knowledge, was first documented by SSW. They found that 
prices in these markets tended to start out below intrinsic value before rising steeply above 
intrinsic value and then crashing. SSW also observed large volumes of trade during the boom, 
while the crash was characterised by much lighter volume. 
When participants are inexperienced in the market environment, the SSW design has been 
found to consistently generate this bubble and crash pattern. Over the past twenty years, an 
extensive body of subsequent research has also shown that the pattern is robust to numerous 
extensions and modifications to the original design. King et al (1993) found that bubbles 
were not reduced by margin buying, equal initial endowments, a limit price change rule, or 
the  use  of  professional  businesspeople  as  traders.  Van  Boening,  Williams  and  LaMaster 
(1993) continued to observe bubbles when a call market institution was used instead of a 4 
continuous double auction, and when the dividend distribution was modified to have a unique 
mode that coincided with the mean. It has similarly been found that bubbles are robust to the 
elimination of uncertainty from the dividend process (Porter and Smith 1995) and the use of 
tournament compensation for traders (James and Isaac 2000). Caginalp, Porter and Smith 
(2001) found that the severity of mispricing is influenced by the amount of liquidity in the 
market, but observed much weaker effects for the deferred payment of dividends and the use 
of an open order book (in the context of a call market). Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux (2001) 
induced a constant time path of intrinsic value instead of a diminishing one as in SSW, yet 
continued to observe bubbles in half of their sessions. In an important contribution, Lei, 
Noussair  and  Plott  (2001)  observed  bubbles  and  crashes  in  an  environment  in  which 
speculation was not possible, since the role of each trader was restricted to that of either a 
buyer or seller with no opportunity for resale. 
To  date,  the  only  condition  that  has  been  widely  acknowledged  to  eliminate  bubbles  in 
experimental asset markets is repeated experience from at least two previous repetitions in 
the  same  market  environment  (SSW  1988;  Van  Boening,  Williams  and  LaMaster  1993; 
Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore 2005). However, a recent paper by Hussam, Porter and 
Smith (2008) has shown that even with twice experienced traders it is possible to rekindle a 
bubble  by  shocking  the  market  environment  with  an  increase  in  liquidity  and  dividend 
uncertainty. In addition to these findings with regard to experience, there is also some mixed 
evidence that bubbles may be diminished by the introduction of short selling (King et al 
1993; Haruvy and Noussair 2006) and futures markets (Porter and Smith 1995; Noussair and 
Tucker 2006). 
With  the  exception  of  some  experiments  reported  in  King  et  al  (1993)  in  which  the 
participants  were  real world  business  people,  the  literature  to  date  has  examined  the 
robustness of bubbles and crashes to the institutional features of the market environment, as 
opposed to the characteristics of the traders themselves. By contrast, in the present study we 
utilise an environment that adheres closely to the standard design of SSW in order to examine 
the behaviour of a market in which the decision makers are teams instead of individuals. 
2.2.  Decision-Making by Individuals and Teams 
Whereas the empirical study of decision making by teams is a relatively recent development 
in  economics,  it  has  a  much  longer  tradition  in  psychology.  Psychologists  define  an 5 
‘intellective’ task as one in which there is a clear normative standard for judging the quality 
of a decision. Moreover, an intellective task is ‘demonstrable’ if the normative solution, once 
identified, is readily grasped as self evidently correct (Laughlin and Ellis 1986). To give an 
economic example, Charness, Karni and Levin (2007) suggest that their test of first order 
stochastic  dominance  satisfies  both  these  criteria.  For  intellective  tasks,  psychologists 
generally  find  that  teams  perform  better  than  individuals,  especially  when  the  task  is 
demonstrable. On the other hand, a ‘judgmental’ task is one for which there is no single 
normatively ‘correct’ answer. Here, an economic example would be a task designed to elicit 
risk attitudes. For judgmental tasks, there does not appear to be any systematic directional 
finding regarding the performance of teams compared to individuals. 
The  limited  economic  literature  on  team  decision making  can  be  divided  into  studies  of 
decision making in non strategic settings, and ones involving strategic interaction. Studies of 
non strategic environments are dominated by experiments on decision making under risk. 
Shupp and Williams (2008) and Baker, Laury and Williams (2008) compare risk attitudes of 
individuals to teams of three. Shupp and Williams do this by eliciting maximum willingness 
to pay bids for lotteries with different probabilities of winning. They find that teams are 
significantly more risk averse when the probability of winning is low, but less risk averse 
when the probability is high. Using a paired lottery choice design, Baker, Laury and Williams 
find no significant difference in the risk preference of individuals and teams. However they 
observe that team decisions are more consistent with risk neutral choices in both the lowest 
and highest risk lotteries, and in this sense ‘less noisy’ than decisions by individuals. 
Bone, Hey and Suckling (1999) and Rockenbach, Sadrieh and Mathauschek (2007) compare 
decisions by teams of, respectively, two and three to those of individuals, and find almost no 
difference  in  the  degree  of  (in)consistency  with  expected  utility  theory.  However, 
Rockenbach, Sadrieh and Mathauschek observe that teams accumulate  significantly more 
expected value than individuals, and at a significantly lower risk, a result they attribute to 
teams’ avoidance of excess risk. Charness, Karni and Levin (2007) study violations of first 
order stochastic dominance and Bayes’ rule by individuals and teams. They find that teams 
commit  fewer  violations  than  individuals,  and  that  the  incidence  of  violations  further 
decreases as team size increases from two to three. 
Blinder  and  Morgan  (2005)  compare  decisions  by  individuals  and  teams  of  five  in  two 
experiments: a framed monetary policy experiment in which the decision maker controls the 6 
interest rate in an economy, and a context free probabilistic ‘urn’ problem. In both contexts, 
they find no significant difference between individuals and teams in the amount of data they 
accumulate before making a decision, but that teams make significantly better decisions. 
Turning  to  studies  of  strategic  interaction,  Kocher  and  Sutter  (2005)  find  no  difference 
between the decisions of individuals and teams of three in the first round of a beauty contest 
experiment. However as the game is repeated, teams converge significantly faster toward the 
game theoretic equilibrium, indicating that teams learn faster than individuals. Cooper and 
Kagel (2005) compare individuals to teams of two in three entry deterrence signalling games. 
They find that teams learn strategic play more rapidly than individuals in all three treatments, 
and that teams’ superior performance increases with the difficulty of the games. 
To date, the study that comes closest to ours in experimentally examining team behaviour in a 
market setting is by Cox and Hayne (2006). They compare bidding behaviour by individuals 
to teams of five in common value auctions in which the number of bidders is either three or 
seven. When both individuals and teams receive a single signal of value, Cox and Hayne find 
no evidence that the winning bids of teams are either more or less rational than those of 
individuals. However, when each member of a team receives their own signal, they find that 
winning teams bid less rationally than individuals in that they fail to discount their bids 
sufficiently to avoid the winner’s curse. 
Finally, there are some empirical studies that are pertinent to our research. Baer, Kempf and 
Ruenzi (2005) analyse data on US mutual funds and find that, controlling for differences in 
size, age and other characteristics, team managed funds take on less risk than individually 
managed funds, and adjust their risk profile less in response to prior performance. Team 
managed funds follow an investment style that is less extreme and more consistent over time. 
Bliss, Potter and Schwartz (2008) similarly find that team managed funds have less risk, and 
that  they  have  lower  expenses  than  individually managed  funds.  However,  an  inherent 
difficulty  with  this  type  of  research  is  that  since  the  intrinsic  value  of  funds’  assets  is 
unobservable, it is not possible to evaluate the effect of team management upon the overall 
performance of the market as a whole. 
To the best of our knowledge, the present paper contributes the first experimental study of 
team behaviour in a continuous time market environment of the type studied by SSW. We 
consider  that  this  environment  entails  both  intellective  and  judgmental  elements.  The 7 
intellective  task  consists  in  correctly  apprehending  the  intrinsic  value  process  of  the 
experimental asset. The judgmental component stems from the fact that a player’s optimal 
choices depend also upon their beliefs as to the extent to which others have attained this same 
insight – this is the well known problem of common knowledge of rationality. 
2.3.  Gender Differences and Interaction Effects 
Although we did not set out to explore gender differences in our study, we observe some 
intriguing gender effects of team composition in our results. Accordingly, we briefly review 
some relevant economic research on this issue. 
A growing body of experimental research explores gender differences in risk preference. 
Although not all studies report significant effects, the consistent directional finding among 
those that do is that females tend to be more risk averse than males, and it is very rare that the 
opposite is found (Eckel and Grossman 2008, Table 1; see also Croson and Gneezy 2008). 
While many of these findings relate to choices over abstract gambles, similar conclusions 
emerge from experiments that invoke financial or investment framing and/or market settings. 
For example, an unpublished manuscript by Levy, Elron and Cohen (1999) (cited in Eckel 
and Grossman 2008) examines gender differences in a stock market game. They observe a 
tendency for males to hold more of their wealth in risky assets, to hold riskier stocks, and to 
make more efficient investments. Although none of these effects is individually significant, 
their combined effect is that males accrue significantly more wealth. 
Evidence from field studies is also consistent with the notion that females tend to be more 
risk  averse  than  males.  For  example,  Jianakoplos  and  Bernasek  (1998)  and  Sundén  and 
Surette (1998) find, respectively, that single women hold significantly less of their wealth in 
risky  assets,  and  choose  more  conservative  asset  allocations  for  their  retirement  savings, 
when compared to single men. Finally, Niessen and Ruenzi (2009) report that female mutual 
fund managers are more risk averse, follow less extreme investment styles, and trade less 
than  their  male  counterparts.  Moreover,  although  there  is  no  difference  in  average 
performance, male fund managers achieve more extreme outcomes. 
Of related interest is the observation that males respond positively to competition whereas 
females do not, and may even find it inhibitive. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) find 
that males respond to tournament incentives by working significantly harder than they do 
under piece rate compensation, whereas females do not. In a follow up study, Niederle and 8 
Vesterlund (2007) allow subjects to choose their preferred compensation scheme. They find 
that  lower ability  males  forgo  earnings  by  choosing  the  tournament,  while  higher ability 
females forgo earnings by choosing the piece rate. 
A much smaller literature explores the role of gender in a group context. For example LePine 
et  al.  (2002)  examine  team  performance  in  a  task  that  is  stereotypically  masculine  and 
(outside  of  the  laboratory)  male dominated  in  its  occupational  demography.  Traditional 
psychological research predicts that male dominated teams would perform particularly well 
at such a task (Wood 1987). In contrast, LePine et al. find that – relative to an objective 
benchmark of correct decisions – all female, female dominated and balanced teams exhibit 
slightly  overaggressive  behaviour,  but  that  male dominated  teams  are  significantly  more 
aggressive. Moreover, all male teams perform the worst, behaving in a significantly more 
overaggressive manner than even male dominated teams. This effect of the proportion of 
male team members indicates that individual characteristics may be compounded in a team 
context, in this case producing an aggressiveness function that is not additive but exponential. 
3.  DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Our team asset market experiments were conducted in the CentERlab at Tilburg University in 
the Netherlands. This facility comprises both a conventional laboratory with 24 partitioned 
workstations  (the  ‘A  Lab’)  and  a  set  of  ten  separated  soundproofed  cubicles,  each  large 
enough to seat two participants side by side in front of the computer (the ‘B Lab’).
1 We 
implement a version of the classic SSW design, as adapted by Haruvy, Noussair and Powell 
(2009), hereinafter HNP. In particular, all parameters in our market are identical to Design 4 
in SSW except that, consistent with the baseline condition in HNP, every trader’s initial 
endowment of experimental money and stock is doubled. 
Whereas each trader in HNP is an individual, in our teams sessions each trader is a randomly 
matched team of two participants.
2 In order to facilitate team deliberation, we increased the 
length of each trading period from four minutes in HNP to five minutes in our teams sessions. 
At the conclusion of our sessions, we paid out the value of each trader’s earnings to both 
team members, using the same exchange rate as in HNP. In other words, each team member 
received  the  same  earnings  as  they  would  have  had  they  executed  the  same  trades  as 
                                                 
1  A floor plan of the CentERlab is available online at http://center.uvt.nl/lab/map1.doc. 
2  Details of the matching procedure and other features of the teams sessions are discussed in Section 3.2. 9 
individuals in HNP (and also faced the same realisations of the dividends). Moreover, we use 
the same computer software as HNP, and we adapt their instructions. Since HNP conduct 
experiments using the same laboratory and subject pool in Tilburg, we can thus compare our 
teams  treatment  directly  to  their  baseline  data,  as  well  as  more  generally  to  the  broader 
literature reporting standard measures of the severity of price bubbles in SSW type markets.  
3.1.  General Market Design 
We implement a market for a single asset that has a life of fifteen trading periods, and which 
pays a stochastic dividend to its current owner at the end of each period. This dividend may 
be 0, 8, 28 or 60 units of experimental currency (‘francs’) per unit of stock (‘share’), each 
with equal probability,  such that the  expected  dividend is 24 francs in each period. The 
dividends are drawn independently in each period, are the same for all shares in a given 
period, and are added to the owner’s cash balance at the conclusion of each period. A trader’s 
holdings of experimental money and stock carry over from one trading period to the next. At 
the conclusion of fifteen periods, all shares expire without any terminal value. The intrinsic 
value of a unit of stock (assuming risk neutrality) is thus 24 times the number of remaining 
periods, and in particular it is 360 in the first period. The dividend structure of the asset was 
clearly explained as part of the instructions read aloud at the start of the experiment, and in 
addition information on its intrinsic value in each period was provided in the form of an 
average holding value table.
3  
Each  experimental  market  consists  of  nine  traders.  At  the  beginning  of  the  first  trading 
period, three traders are endowed with an initial portfolio consisting of 450 francs and six 
shares.  A  further  three  traders  are  endowed  with  1,170  francs  and  four  shares,  and  the 
remaining three traders are endowed with 1,890 francs and two shares. The intrinsic value of 
each trader’s initial endowment is thus the same (namely 2,610 francs), and in particular all 
endowments are double the ones employed by SSW.
4  
The market operates under continuous double auction rules, and traders are not allowed to 
buy on margin or sell short. During the  course of a trading period, each trader’s screen 
displays their current holdings of experimental money and stock, the history of transaction 
                                                 
3  Refer to Appendix A for the complete text of the instructions. 
4   Each trader is not aware of the endowments of the other traders as they only know of their own, which they 
are informed of at the commencement of the first trading period. 10 
prices in the current period, and the open order book of bids and asks. At the conclusion of 
each  period,  the  screen  displays  summary  information  including  the  realisation  of  the 
dividend for the period just concluded.
5 The computerised market was implemented using the 
z Tree programming environment (Fischbacher 2007). 
A trader’s earnings from the experiment are derived from the amount of experimental money 
they hold at the end of the fifteenth period, after the dividend for that period has been paid. 
This is equal to their initial endowment of cash, plus earnings from dividends, plus proceeds 
from sales of shares, minus expenditures on purchases of shares. At the conclusion of the 
experiment, this balance was converted into Euros at an exchange rate of 100 francs to one 
Euro, and paid to the participants in cash. 
3.2.  Teams Sessions 
We conducted six teams sessions at the CentERlab in Tilburg, between 5 and 13 February 
2009. All sessions were conducted in English, and all participants were currently enrolled 
students of Tilburg University. We oversubscribed sessions to ensure that there would be 
eighteen participants (nine teams of two) in each session, for a total of 108 participants. The 
average age of the participants was 22.7 years, 41 percent were males, and 85 percent were 
majoring in Economics or Business Administration. No individual was allowed to participate 
in more than one session.  
The average length of each session was 2.5 hours. We used the A Lab to train participants in 
the use of the trading interface, to conduct a practice period, to read out the instructions and 
to assign the participants into teams. These tasks together took approximately 35 minutes. 
Each team was then seated in a separate cubicle in the B Lab where they completed the main 
experiment. Figure 1 shows a photo of one of the cubicles in the B Lab. The fifteen five 
minute trading periods plus summary screens took approximately 85 minutes to complete. 
The participants then returned to the A Lab to complete a post experiment questionnaire 
individually. Finally, given that both members of each team receive the same earnings, we 
paid  the  participants  in  teams,  anonymously  of  the  remaining  participants.  The  average 
earnings  per  participant  were  29.15  Euro  (USD  37.53  at  the  time  of  the  experiments), 
                                                 
5  Refer to Appendix B for sample screen shots. 11 
inclusive of a five Euro show up fee.
6 The questionnaire and payments together took up the 
final 30 minutes of the session. 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
In particular, after participants had signed in, we directed them to sit at any available terminal 
in the A Lab. We then distributed and read aloud the first section of the instructions, dealing 
with the mechanics of using the trading interface to post offers and to buy and sell shares.
7 
These were identical to the corresponding instructions used by HNP. The participants were 
then given approximately ten minutes in which to practice trading using the interface. The 
participants completed this practice period individually, and it did not count toward their 
earnings. It is worth emphasising that the participants completed the practice task before they 
had  been  told  about  the  dividend  structure  of  the  asset,  how  their  earnings  would  be 
determined, or that they would undertake the main part of the experiment in teams. 
We next circulated and read aloud the remaining sections of the instructions, dealing with the 
team design of the experiment, dividend structure of the asset, average holding value table 
and calculation of earnings. These were adapted from the corresponding instructions from 
HNP by emphasising that all dividends and cash balances accrue to both members of each 
team. To assign participants into teams we used a bucket containing eighteen slips of paper, 
two with each number from one to nine. Each participant drew one slip from the bucket and 
the  two  participants  who  drew  the  same  number  were  paired  together  as  a  team.  The 
participants were then escorted to the appropriate cubicles in the B Lab. When all teams were 
ready, the doors to the cubicles were closed and the experiment commenced.
8 
Upon completion of the experiment, the participants were told to return to their original seats 
in  the  A  Lab,  where  they  completed  a  post experiment  questionnaire  individually.
9  This 
included basic demographic items such as age, gender, native language, major field of study 
and  income.  It  also  included  questions  regarding  the  team  decision making  process,  and 
asked participants to self assess their own ranking out of the nine teams with respect to their 
                                                 
6  The range of payments was from 9.3 to 109.6 Euro inclusive of the show up fee, and the standard deviation 
was 16.42 Euro. These figures exclude an experimenter error that resulted in participants in one session 
receiving excess payments (participants only learned of this after the experiment had concluded). 
7  The same experimenter was responsible for reading out the instructions in all six teams sessions. 
8  There was a call button in each cubicle, which the participants could use to alert the experimenters in the 
event of any questions or other difficulties. 
9   Refer to Appendix C for the list of items included in the post experiment questionnaire. 12 
earnings. Finally, it included a ten item test of financial literacy derived from van Rooij, 
Lusardi and Alessie (2007). When all participants had completed the questionnaire, we called 
each team out one at a time to receive their earnings in privacy in an adjoining office. 
4.  RESULTS 
Our main result is that bubbles are indeed diminished under our teams treatment. This holds 
both relative to the ‘narrow’ baseline provided by the HNP data as well as the much larger 
literature on SSW type markets generally. We document the support for this result in Section 
4.1. In addition to this primary result, we observe additional unanticipated results regarding 
the gender composition of our two person teams and in particular the performance of all male 
teams. We report these findings in Section 4.2. 
4.1.  Market Performance under the Teams Treatment 
Figure 2 presents an initial impression of the trajectory of market prices under our teams 
treatment. It shows the median transaction price in each trading period for each of our teams 
sessions, with the stepped line representing the time path of intrinsic value. From this, it can 
be seen that price bubbles are not completely eliminated under the teams treatment: Sessions 
3 and 6 display bubble and crash patterns that are broadly similar to those that have been 
observed in previous studies. In each of our remaining four sessions, prices do briefly rise 
above intrinsic value, but the magnitude of the discrepancy is comparatively small and prices 
track intrinsic values closely over the final one third of the session. To provide an initial 
comparison of the teams treatment to the individuals data from HNP, Figure 3 plots the 
corresponding price trajectories from their sessions. Four of their sessions exhibit the bubble 
and crash pattern, while a pronounced ‘negative bubble’ is observed in a fifth session. In only 
one of the six individuals sessions do we observe prices tracking broadly in line with intrinsic 
value through the middle to later stages of the market. 
[Figures 2 and 3 about here.] 
To facilitate a more formal comparison, we follow previous studies in computing a range of 
well established measures of the magnitude  and volume of mispriced transactions. These 
bubble measures allow us to compare our teams treatment not only against the ‘narrow’ 
baseline provided by HNP but also against the broader literature on SSW style markets, since 
the measures normalise for differences in parameterisation across studies. For each of the 13 
measures, which will be defined in the discussion below, a larger value indicates a more 
pronounced price bubble.
10 We report our analysis of these bubble measures in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
The first two sections of Table 1 report values for each of the measures in each of the six 
sessions of the teams and HNP baseline treatments respectively, along with treatment means. 
The next two rows report p values for tests of the null hypothesis of equality of central 
tendency between the individual and teams treatments, in parametric and nonparametric tests 
respectively. The final two rows are derived from a database of bubble measure observations 
that the second author has assembled for another paper. The second to last row reports mean 
values of each measure for all available observations in the database for which participants 
were  inexperienced  in  the  experimental  market.  In  the  final  row,  we  narrow  this  set  of 
observations down to inexperienced ‘baseline’ sessions that conform particularly closely to 
the classic SSW design. These are limited to markets in which the intrinsic value of the 
experimental asset is diminishing over time, which employ a double auction institution, and 
in  which  there  is  no  short  selling  or  futures  market.  The  list  of  inexperienced  baseline 
observations is itemised in the note to Table 1. 
Our bubble measure analysis is based upon one measure of the volume of trade in the market, 
six measures of different aspects of the deviation of transaction prices from intrinsic value, 
and one measure of price volatility. 
Turnover (King et al. 1993) is a measure of the volume of share transactions relative to the 
number of shares on issue in the market: 
1
T
t t Turnover q TSU
= =∑  
where T is the number of trading periods, qt is the number of transactions in period t and TSU 
(Total Stock of Units) is the total number of shares in the market. 
Amplitude is a measure of the overall magnitude of peak to trough deviations in the mean 
transaction price in a period from intrinsic value. In the version of this measure defined by 
Haruvy and Noussair (2006), the maximum and minimum price deviations are evaluated 
relative to intrinsic value in the current period, such that: 
                                                 
10  For Average Bias, strongly negative values indicate a negative bubble, i.e. prices below fundamental value. 14 
( ) ( ) max / min / t t t t t t t t Amplitude P f f P f f     = − − −      
where  t P  is the mean transaction price in period t and ft is intrinsic value in period t. A high 
value of this measure indicates large price swings relative to intrinsic value. 
Duration (Porter and Smith 1995) is defined as the length of the longest sequence of periods 
over  which  the  difference  between  the  mean  transaction  price  and  the  intrinsic  value 
increases consecutively from one period to the next: 
( ) 1 1 max : t t t t t m t m Duration m P f P f P f + + + + = − < − < < − …  
Average Bias (Haruvy and Noussair 2006) is a measure of the average strength and direction 
of the deviation of the median transaction price in a period from intrinsic value in that period: 
( ) 1
T
t t t Average Bias P f T
= = − ∑ ɶ  
where  t P ɶ  is the median transaction price in period t. 
Average Dispersion (Haruvy and Noussair 2006) measures the average absolute discrepancy 
between the median transaction price in a period and intrinsic value. It differs from Average 
Bias in that it penalises both positive and negative deviations, where these may potentially 
cancel out in the expression for Average Bias. The Average Dispersion is defined as: 
1
T
t t t Average Dispersion P f T
= = − ∑ ɶ  
Overpriced Transactions (Palan 2009) is the percentage of all transactions that occur at prices 
in excess of the maximum remaining dividend value of a share. It is defined as: 
max
1 1 1 100
t T q T
it t t i t Overpriced Transactions I q
= = = = ×∑ ∑ ∑  
where Iit
max is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if Pit > ft
max (where Pit is the price of 
the ith transaction in period t and ft
max is the maximum possible return to holding a share from 
period t until the end of the market), and Iit
max = 0 otherwise. This measure provides a strong 
indication of speculative trade, since speculation is the only rationale (short of irrationality) 
that can explain why a trader would be willing to purchase shares at a price in excess of ft
max. 15 
Normalised  Deviation  (King  et  al.  1993)  measures  the  aggregate  absolute  deviation  of 
individual transaction prices from intrinsic value, normalised by the Total Stock of Units: 
( ) 1 1 100
t T q
it t t i Normalised Deviation P f TSU
= = = − × ∑ ∑  
Since it combines both volume and price information into a single measure that penalises 
high  turnover  at  prices  that  deviate  from  intrinsic  value,  Normalised  Deviation  can  be 
considered to be the most comprehensive of the measures of mispricing that we report.
11 
Finally,  Dispersion  Ratio  (Palan  2009)  is  a  measure  of  price  volatility,  which  has  been 
designed to normalise for differences in both the level and change over time in the variability 














it P σ  is the sample standard deviation of transaction prices in period t, and 
t f σ  is the 
population standard deviation of the remaining dividend stream on a share in period t. A 
value of the Dispersion Ratio equal to unity thus indicates that transaction prices are on 
average exactly as variable as the dividend stream on a share. 
The mean bubble measures reported in Table 1 indicate that on average we attain smaller 
values of all but one of these eight bubble measures under our teams treatment than in the 
baseline data from HNP. Moreover, the formal tests reported in the table confirm that with 
one additional exception, these differences  are at least marginally  significant in both the 
parametric and nonparametric tests.
12 Although the significance levels of the individual test 
statistics are inhibited by the limited number of observations, the strength of our result is 
reinforced by the fact that it holds across the full spectrum of bubble measures which have 
been  designed  to  capture  a  broad  range  of  volume,  temporal,  price  and  volatility 
characteristics of an experimental market. 
                                                 
11  The reason for dividing by 100 in the expression for Normalised Deviation is to make the results of our 
study, in which the dividends are expressed as 0, 8, 28 or 60 experimental ‘cents’ comparable to earlier 
studies in which the dividends were expressed as 0.00, 0.08, 0.28 or 0.60 experimental ‘dollars’. 
12  The  exception  is  Amplitude,  for  which  we  just  fail  to  attain  a  conventional  significance  level  in  the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p = 0.109). 16 
Our strongest result is for Duration: in every one of our teams sessions, we observe Duration 
less than or equal to that of the lowest value observed in the HNP sessions. The measure for 
which we clearly fail to obtain a result is Average Bias. Recall however that the definition of 
this measure allows periods of negative deviation from intrinsic value to cancel with periods 
of positive deviation, and that the HNP data includes sessions with both very large positive 
and  negative  deviations.  By  contrast,  the  measure  of  Average  Dispersion  penalises  all 
absolute  deviations,  both  positive  and  negative.  Given  that  we  observe  a  lower  Average 
Dispersion under our teams treatment (p = 0.063 in a t test and p = 0.078 in a rank sum test), 
we confirm that prices do indeed track intrinsic values more closely in an absolute sense 
under the teams treatment. 
In addition to observing prices that track more closely to intrinsic value, we also observe 
lower Turnover under our teams treatment (p = 0.045 in a t test and p = 0.055 in a rank sum 
test). Figure 4 sheds further light on this by plotting the mean number of transactions per 
period for the six sessions of the teams and HNP baseline treatments respectively. It shows 
that the average number of transactions is lower under the teams treatment in all but one of 
the fifteen periods, with the most pronounced differences seen at the beginning of the market. 
This lower volume of trade is observed despite the fact that we increased the length of the 
trading periods from four minutes in the individuals sessions to five in the teams sessions. 
We  also  observe  lower  price  volatility  under  our  teams  treatment  as  measured  by  the 
Dispersion Ratio (p = 0.071 in a t test and p = 0.055 in a rank sum test). Figure 5 provides 
further  support  for  this  result  by  plotting  the  mean  of  the  sample  standard  deviation  of 
transaction  prices  in  each  period  for  the  six  sessions  of  the  teams  and  HNP  baseline 
treatments respectively. It shows that the average volatility in transaction prices in a period is 
lower under the teams treatment for all but one out of fifteen trading periods. 
On the basis of the above results, we conclude that our teams markets are characterised by 
price deviations that are smaller in magnitude, shorter in duration, and associated with lower 
volume and price volatility. Several of these dimensions are combined in the measure of 
Normalised Deviation, which penalises absolute price deviations from intrinsic value at the 
level of individual transactions. As such, this measure penalises both the number of mispriced 
transactions and the (absolute) extent of mispricing, effectively combining the information 
from Turnover and Average Dispersion. Since we observe lower values for both Turnover 
and Average Dispersion under our teams treatment, it comes as no surprise that we also 17 
observe significantly lower Normalised Deviation (p = 0.030 in a t test and p = 0.037 in a 
rank sum test). Since we regard the Normalised Deviation as the most comprehensive of the 
bubble measures in Table 1, we also consider this result to be our central finding with respect 
to the effect of our teams treatment. 
4.2.  Gender Effects 
Although we did not specifically design our study to investigate gender effects, an initial 
exploration of our questionnaire and earnings data indicated that further examination of such 
effects might be warranted. Table 2 shows some relevant summary statistics for the 108 
participants in our teams sessions.
13 The first three columns present summary data organised 
according to the gender composition of our 54 teams – either all male, all female or mixed. 
In the next two columns the data is organised according to the  gender of the individual 
participants, and in the final column it is presented for the sample as a whole.  
[Table 2 about here.] 
A participant’s Normalised Earnings is derived by subtracting from their earnings the mean 
earnings in their session, and dividing the result by the session mean earnings. The resulting 
variable has a mean of zero and can be interpreted as a measure of earnings over  or under 
performance  relative  to  the  average  in  a  session.  Estimated  Rank  is  an  individual 
participant’s estimate of their team’s ranking out of nine teams in their session with respect 
to earnings, where a value of one signifies the top rank. Actual Rank is a team’s actual 
ranking. Financial Literacy is a participant’s score on a ten item test of financial literacy.
14 
The results in Table 2 point to some weak evidence of higher earnings by male teams. In an 
OLS regression of Normalised Earnings on dummies for all male and all female teams, male 
teams  have  a  factor  loading  of  0.719  (p = 0.009),  while  neither  the  intercept  nor  the 
coefficient  for  female  teams  is  significantly  different  from  zero.  Although  this  result  is 
consistent  with  an  analysis  of  the  earnings  of  individual  males  and  females  in  the  HNP 
sessions, it is not very robust. It ceases to be significant when we remove an outlier in the all 
                                                 
13   Appendix  C  contains  the  full  text  of  the  post experiment  questionnaire,  including  the  coding  of  the 
categorical response items. 
14   We derived this measure from van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007), who construct measures of financial 
literacy for the general Dutch population. Their measures consist of five basic literacy questions and eleven 
advanced literacy questions. For our ten item score we utilised three of their basic literacy questions (items 
1, 3 and 5) and seven of their advanced literacy questions (items 6 through 12). 18 
male teams.
15 We trace the low power of this test to our treatment design: we did not design 
our  study  to  explore  gender  effects  but  recruited  and  assigned  participants  into  teams  at 
random. Given the high proportion of our sample that is female, the result is that we have 
only seven all male teams in our data. 
With this in mind, it is striking that a number of other analyses nonetheless turn out to be 
highly significant. In particular, we find a significant and robust difference in the variability 
of Normalised Earnings between all male teams and other teams (p = 0.000 both in a two 
sided  variance  ratio  test  and  in  Levene’s  robust  equality  of  variance  test;  remaining 
significant after removing the outlier, with variance ratio p = 0.024 and Levene p = 0.004). 
Regressing a normalised version of a participant’s Estimated Rank on their normalised Actual 
Rank and dummies for male and female teams, we find that members of all male teams 
exhibit  significant  overconfidence  (OLS  coefficient  = −1.487  with  p = 0.007,  remaining 
significant at p = 0.025 after removing the outlier), while the coefficient on the female team 
dummy is not significant. Neither an individual participant’s gender nor financial literacy is 
significant  if  added  to  the  regression.  Thus  we  find  that  members  of  all male  teams 
overestimate their team’s performance, while males generally (i.e. including those in mixed 
teams) do not. This is particularly telling given that each participant reports their Estimated 
Rank individually and separately from their partner. 
To investigate the causes of the higher earnings variability (and weak evidence of higher 
earnings) for all male teams, we analyse the pattern of changes in their stock holdings over 
time. A team that increases its holdings of stock when shares are undervalued and decrease its 
holdings when they are overvalued will on average have higher earnings than one that does 
the opposite. Figure 6 shows that such an effect may contribute to our results. It shows that 
the average all male team increases its holdings considerably over periods one to four when 
prices tend to be below intrinsic value (as indicated by the bars in the bottom part of the 
chart). It then decreases its holdings between periods five and eight, when prices typically 
                                                 
15  One male team achieved Normalised Earnings of 4.24, compared to a mean of 1.22 (standard deviation of 
0.74) for the other male teams. Nonetheless, as noted in the text, our remaining gender results are robust to 
removing this outlier. 19 
exceed intrinsic value. There is a mirrored pattern for female teams, and no material change 
in the average holdings of mixed teams over time.
16, 17 
[Figure 6 about here.] 
The correlation over time between the aggregate stock holdings of male teams and the period 
median price deviation from intrinsic value is −0.44, while for female teams it is 0.57 and for 
mixed teams it is −0.03. However, when we examine the correlation between stock holdings 
and price deviations from intrinsic value at the level of each individual team, we find a more 
nuanced  picture.  For  neither  male  nor  mixed  teams  is  the  mean  correlation  significantly 
different from zero, and while the mean correlation coefficient of 0.204 for female teams is 
positive and significant (p = 0.012), it is not significantly different from the other teams’. 
Even  more  interesting  than  the  size  of  the  individual  correlation  coefficients  is  their 
distribution as documented in Figure 7. It shows that while there is no clear evidence of all 
male teams following more profitable strategies (i.e. negative correlation), there is a clear 
pattern of male teams following more extreme strategies. Taking the absolute value of the 
correlation coefficient (i.e. isolating those teams that condition their stock holdings most 
strongly on price deviations from intrinsic value in an absolute sense), the top fifteen teams 
contain all seven all male teams (100%), but only seven out of the thirty mixed teams (23%), 
and one out of the seventeen female teams (6%). We thus find that – whether rightly or 
wrongly  –  our  all male  teams  condition  much  more  strongly  on  price  in  their  trading 
behaviour. This tendency toward extremes is also reflected in the earnings of the seven all 
male teams: four of them attain an Actual Rank of first or second in their session; however 
the remaining three teams rank either eighth or last. 
[Figure 7 about here.] 
To summarise, we find that all male teams follow more extreme strategies, thereby attaining 
more variable earnings. However it is not so clear that these strategies result in consistently 
                                                 
16  A Kruskal Wallis test of normalised stock holdings by all male, all female and mixed teams rejects the null 
hypothesis of equal distributions with a p value of 0.048. On average, male teams hold somewhat more 
stock than mixed teams over the duration of the market (mean = 1.305 for male teams vs. 0.053 for mixed, 
p = 0.034 in a t test, but Wilcoxon rank sum p = 0.786), while female teams hold significantly less than 
mixed teams (mean = −0.631 for female teams, p = 0.009 in a t test, and p = 0.012 in a Wilcoxon test). 
17  There were seven male and seventeen female teams, which explains why the average stock holdings of male 
teams increased by more than a factor of 2, while the corresponding female teams’ holdings decreased by a 
factor of less than 0.5, with mixed teams holding their average stock inventory largely constant. 20 
superior earnings. We also find that members of all male teams are overconfident whereas 
males generally are not. Finally, it is worth remarking that although we find that males score 
higher  on  our  test  of  financial  literacy,  this  cannot  explain  why  mixed  teams  do  not 
outperform female teams, why financial literacy has no explanatory power in a regression of 
Estimated Rank, or why some of our all male teams adopt strategies that are unprofitable in 
the extreme. We thus conjecture that, consistent with the findings of LePine et al (2002), our 
results may be driven by factors specific to the psychology of decision making in all male (or 
more generally, male dominated) environments. However a deeper understanding of these 
factors must await future research designed specifically for this purpose. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Differences in decision making between individuals and teams have long been the subject of 
research in psychology, but have not been studied to nearly the same extent in economics – 
and especially not in market settings. At the same time, institutional investors such as mutual 
funds increasingly rely on teams as opposed to individuals to make decisions regarding the 
allocation  of  capital.  Conversely,  research  on  experimental  asset  markets  has  focused  on 
features of the market environment as opposed to the characteristics of market participants. 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of team decision making in an experimental asset 
market  that  has  long  been  known  to  reliably  generate  price  bubbles  and  crashes  when 
populated  with  individuals.  We  find  that  our  teams  treatment  significantly  reduces  the 
severity of this phenomenon, as measured by a full spectrum of measures designed to capture 
a broad range of dimensions of a price bubble. Thus our teams markets are characterised by 
price  deviations  that  are  significantly  smaller  in  magnitude,  shorter  in  duration,  and 
associated with lower volume and price volatility. 
In  addition  to  these  results  concerning  our  primary  research  question,  we  report  some 
unanticipated results concerning gender effects in team composition. In particular, we find 
that all male teams condition more strongly on price deviations from intrinsic value in an 
absolute sense, but not consistently in the direction that would imply greater profitability. As 
a result, their earnings are more variable, but not necessarily superior. We find that members 
of all male teams are overconfident whereas males generally are not. These results cannot be 
explained by males’ higher average financial literacy. The distinctive behaviour of all male 
teams warrants further research. Furthermore, and in line with Croson and Gneezy (2008), we 21 
urge experimenters to routinely record the gender of their subjects where possible in order to 
permit further investigation of the role of gender in economic decision making. 22 
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Session 1  5.17  1.09  7  −45.20  72.27  0.00  7.11  0.17 
Session 2  4.17  0.76  7  −5.57  40.83  0.00  2.73  0.23 
Session 3  5.31  3.15  6  57.57  145.90  9.95  9.69  0.54 
Session 4  3.22  1.12  7  1.80  49.40  0.00  1.79  0.14 
Session 5  1.11  0.84  7  10.18  31.27  0.00  0.44  0.10 
Session 6  3.03  2.27  7  73.30  87.23  8.26  2.05  0.30 
Treatment Average  3.67  1.54  6.83  15.35  71.15  3.03  3.97  0.25 
HNP Baseline Sessions 
Session 1  6.38  0.91  10  −60.47  61.53  0.00  7.62  0.39 
Session 2  6.56  4.30  7  153.13  281.93  12.11  18.13  1.88 
Session 3  11.25  1.21  13  −125.23  126.97  0.00  19.03  0.24 
Session 4  4.31  3.94  7  33.80  84.33  21.29  5.89  0.83 
Session 5  5.50  3.54  9  19.57  170.50  18.69  10.37  0.49 
Session 6  3.19  2.22  9  57.50  87.37  11.76  3.18  0.45 
Treatment Average  6.20  2.69  9.17  13.05  135.44  10.64  10.70  0.71 
t test, unequal variances 
(one sided p values)  0.045
**  0.070
*  0.025





Wilcoxon rank sum test 
(p value)  0.055
*  0.109  0.020





All inexperienced markets in 

















All inexperienced baseline 



















*** denotes significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level respectively. For t tests, we report one sided p values for 
the null hypothesis that the mean under the teams treatment is closer to zero. The entries in the bottom two rows 
are derived from a database of bubble measure observations compiled for publication by the second author. The 
set of observations included in the inexperienced baseline classification are derived from Ackert and Church 
(2001):  Inexperienced  baseline  (IB)  treatment,  Table 3,  p. 17;  Corgnet,  Kujal  and  Porter  (2008):  Baseline 
treatment,  Table  10,  p.  26,  Table A1,  p. 31,  and  using  data  from  Corgnet  et  al.  (2007);  Davies  (2006): 
Decreasing  fundamental  value  treatments:  Annex 4,  pp. 31 3;  Dufwenberg,  Lindqvist  and  Moore  (2005): 
Markets 1 3, Table 1, p. 1734, Table 4A, p. 32; Haruvy and Noussair (2006): NSS treatments, Table II, p. 1132; 
Hussam, Porter and Smith (2008): Inexperienced treatment, Table 4, p. 934; King et al. (1993): Inexperienced 
baseline treatment, Table 13.1, p. 185; Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001): One market treatment, Table I, p. 836 and 
Table IV,  p. 850;  Porter  and  Smith  (1994):  Baseline  treatment,  Table  2,  p.  116;  Porter  and  Smith  (1995): 
Baseline treatment, Table 5, p. 521; Smith, Van Boening and Wellford (2000): Markets A2 1 to A2 6, Appendix 
Table 1,  p. 582;  and  SSW:  Experiments  26,  41  and  90,  Table 1,  p. 1126,  Figure 7,  p. 1131,  Figure 11  and 
Figure 13, pp. 1134 35. 26 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF PERFORMANCE IN TEAMS SESSIONS 
  Teams    Individuals   
  Male  Female  Mixed    Male  Female    All 
  (n = 7)  (n = 17)  (n = 30)    (n = 44)  (n = 64)    (n = 108) 
Normalised Earnings  0.65
*  –0.16
*  –0.06    0.16
*  –0.11
*    0.00 
  (1.31
***)  (0.56)  (0.36
***)    (0.85
***)  (0.48
***)    (0.67) 
Estimated Rank (1–9)  3.07
***  5.24
*  4.72    4.25
*  4.95
*    4.67 
  (2.09)  (2.16)  (1.88)    (2.15)  (2.01)    (2.09) 
Actual Rank (1–9)  4.29  5.71
**  4.77    4.61  5.27    5.00 
  (3.67
**)  (2.41)  (2.35)    (2.81)  (2.42)    (2.59) 
Financial Literacy (0–10)  8.07  7.32  7.85    8.36
***  7.27
***    7.71 
  (2.02)  (2.24)  (1.76)    (1.45
***)  (2.14
***)    (1.96) 
The  table  shows  means  (standard  deviations  in  brackets)  at  the  subject  level,  grouped  by  team 
composition and gender for participants in the teams sessions. 
*/
**/
*** denotes significance of a two 
sample  t test  with  unequal  variances  (a  two group  variance  ratio  test  in  case  of  the  standard 
deviations) at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (comparing e.g. male teams with all non male teams, or male 
individuals with all female individuals). 27 
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Volume per period, means over sessions by treatment. The percentage of the total volume transacted 
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Mean stock holdings by team composition (lines, left hand scale), and mean deviation of median 
period transaction prices from fundamental value (bars, right hand scale). Since the initial endowment 
of each team was randomly drawn, the intercept of each line (period “0”) shows the average starting 


















































Distributions of the coefficients of correlation between changes in individual team stock holdings and 
median period stock price deviation, by type of team. 34 
APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEAMS SESSIONS 
1.  General Instructions 
This is an experiment on decision making in a market. The instructions are simple and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will 
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The experiment consists of a sequence of trading 
Periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market. The currency used in the 
market is francs. All trading will be done in terms of francs. The cash payment to you at the end of the 
experiment will be in euros. The conversion rate is: 100 francs to 1 Euro. 
2.  How to use the Computerized Market  
In the top right hand corner of the screen you see how much time is left in the current trading Period. 
The goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. In the center of your screen 
you see the number of Shares you currently have and the amount of Money you have available to buy 
Shares.  
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled “Enter offer to sell” in the first 
column. In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a share, and then 
select “Submit Offer To Sell”. Please do so now. Type in a number in the appropriate space, and then 
click  on  the  field  labeled  “Submit  Offer  To  Sell”.  You  will  notice  that  eighteen  numbers,  one 
submitted by each participant, now appear in the second column from the left, entitled “Offers To 
Sell”. Your offer is listed in blue. Submitting a second offer will replace your previous offer. 
The lowest offer to sell price will always be on the bottom of that list. You can select an offer by 
clicking on it. It will then be highlighted. If you select “Buy”, the button at the bottom of this column, 
you will buy one share for the currently selected sell price. Please purchase a share now by selecting 
an offer and clicking the “Buy” button. Since each of you had offered to sell a share and attempted to 
buy a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you started out with. This 
is because you bought one share and sold one share. Please note that if you have an offer selected and 
the offer gets changed, it will become deselected if the offer became worse for you. If the offer gets 
better, it will remain selected. 
When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase. When you sell a share 
your Money increases by the price of the sale. You may make an offer to buy a unit by selecting 
“Submit offer to buy.” Please do so now. Type a number in the text area “Enter offer to buy”, then 
press the red button labeled “Submit Offer To Buy”. You can replace your offer to buy by submitting 
a new offer. You can accept any of the offers to buy by selecting the offer and then clicking on the 
“Sell” button. Please do so now.  
In the middle column, labeled “Transaction Prices”, you can see the prices at which Shares have been 
bought and sold in this period. You will now have about 10 minutes to buy and sell shares. This is a 
practice period. Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not 
influence your position later in the experiment. The only goal of the practice period is to master the 
use of the interface. Please be sure that you have successfully submitted offers to buy and offers to 
sell. Also be sure that you have accepted buy and sell offers. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will come by and assist you. 35 
3.  Specific Instructions for this Experiment 
In  this  experiment  you  will  be randomly  paired  with  a  partner,  with  whom  you  will  be  making 
decisions jointly as a team of two. It is important that both you and your partner agree on each of the 
decisions you make over the course of the experiment, as they may influence the earnings that you 
both receive at the conclusion of the experiment. At the end of the experiment both you and your 
partner will each receive the total value of your team’s cash balance, converted into Euros at the 
conversion rate specified at the beginning of these instructions. 
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods. In each period, there will be a market open for 5 
minutes, in which your team may buy and sell shares. Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods, and 
your team’s inventory of shares carries over from one trading period to the next. Your team may 
receive dividends for each share in its inventory at the end of each of the 15 trading periods.  
At the end of each trading period, including period 15, the computer will randomly determine the 
dividend value for all shares in that period. Each period, each share your team holds at the end of the 
period: 
•  earns a dividend of 0 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
•  earns a dividend of 8 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
•  earns a dividend of 28 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
•  earns a dividend of 60 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
Each of the four dividend values is equally likely, thus the average dividend in each period is 24. 
Dividends are added to your team’s cash balance automatically. 
After the dividend is paid at the end of period 15, there will be no further earnings possible from 
shares. 
4.  Average Holding Value Table 
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE to help you make decisions. There are 5 
columns in the table. The first column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading period of the 
experiment.  The  second  column,  labeled  Current  Period,  indicates  the  period  during  which  the 
average holding value is being calculated. The third column gives the number of holding periods from 
the period in the second column until the end of the experiment. The fourth column, labeled Average 
Dividend per Period, gives the average amount that the dividend will be in each period for each unit 
held  in  your  team’s  inventory.  The  fifth  column,  labeled  Average  Holding  Value  Per  Unit  of 
Inventory, gives the average value for each unit held in your team’s inventory from now until the end 
of the experiment. That is, for each share your team holds for the remainder of the experiment, both 
you and your partner will each earn on average the amount listed in column 5.  
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend on a Share has a 25% 
chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28 and a 25% chance of being 60 
in any period, the dividend is on average 24 per period for each Share. If your team holds a Share for 
the remaining 7 periods, the total dividend for the Share over the 7 periods is on average 7 × 24 = 168. 
Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 7 periods is on average 168. 36 






Holding Periods  × Average Dividend 
Per Period  = Average Holding Value  
Per Share in Inventory 
15  1  15    24    360 
15  2  14    24    336 
15  3  13    24    312 
15  4  12    24    288 
15  5  11    24    264 
15  6  10    24    240 
15  7  9    24    216 
15  8  8    24    192 
15  9  7    24    168 
15  10  6    24    144 
15  11  5    24    120 
15  12  4    24    96 
15  13  3    24    72 
15  14  2    24    48 
15  15  1    24    24 
5.  Your Earnings 
Your earnings for the entire experiment will equal the amount of cash that your team has at the end of 
period 15, after the last dividend has been paid. The amount of cash you will have is equal to:  
The cash (called “Money” on your screen) your team has at the beginning of the experiment  
+ dividends your team receives  
+ money received by your team from sales of shares 
– money spent by your team on purchases of shares 
Both you and your partner will each receive the total value of this cash balance, converted into Euros 
at the conversion rate specified at the beginning of these instructions. 37 
APPENDIX B: SCREEN SHOTS OF THE TRADING PROGRAM 
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APPENDIX C: POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
Team ID: 
Are you: 
[0. female; 1. male] 
Your age: 
Are you a: 
[0. domestic student; 1. international student] 
Your native language: 
[0. Dutch; 1. other (please specify)] 
In what level of degree program are you currently enrolled? 
[0. Bachelor’s; 1. Master’s; 2. M.Phil; 3. PhD; 4. other (please specify)] 
What is your current year of enrolment in this degree? 
What is your major field of study? 
What is your annual income in Euro? (Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest 
and dividend payments, scholarship support, student loans, parental support, social security, alimony, 
child support and others.) 
[0. Less than 7,500; 1. 7,501 to 12,500; 2. 12,501 to 17,500; 3. 17,501 to 22,500; 4.More than 
22,500] 
What is the combined annual income of yourself and all of your family members who live with you at 
the same residence in Euro? (Consider all forms of income as defined above.) 
[0. Less than 20,000; 1. 20,001 to 40,000; 2. 40,001 to 60,000; 3. 60,001 to 80,000; 4. More 
than 80,000] 
What was your strategy during the experiment? 
Do you believe that you acted rationally and that you maximized your profit? 
[0. Do not agree at all; through to 4. Agree completely] 
Did you ever make a mistake in entering a price, or clicked a wrong button? If so, please tell us 
exactly what went wrong and in what period! 
Out of the 9 teams, which rank do you think your team has attained with regard to your earnings (“1” 
signifying the best, “9” the worst result)? 
Do you think your decisions were better or worse than if you had had to reach your decisions alone? 
[0. Much worse than alone; through to 4. Much better than alone] 
How much did you contribute to the joint decision? 
[0. 0%; through to 10. 100%] 
Was it easy for you to come to a joint decision? 
[0. Not at all easy; through to 4. Very easy] 
How did you solve conflicts if you could not agree? 39 
Financial Literacy Questions 
Suppose you had €100 in a savings account and the interest rate is 20% per year and you never withdraw 
money or interest payments. After 5 years, how much would you have on this account in total? 
￿  More than €200; 
￿  Exactly €200; 
￿  Less than €200; 
￿  Do not know. 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. 
After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account? 
￿  More than today; 
￿  Exactly the same; 
￿  Less than today; 
￿  Do not know. 
Suppose that in the year 2010, your income has doubled and prices of all goods have doubled too. In 
2010, how much will you be able to buy with your income? 
￿  More than today; 
￿  The same; 
￿  Less than today; 
￿  Do not know. 
Which of the following statements describes the main function of the stock market? 
￿  The stock market helps to predict stock earnings; 
￿  The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks; 
￿  The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together with those who want to sell stocks; 
￿  None of the above; 
￿  Do not know. 
Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys the stock of firm B in the stock market: 
￿  He owns a part of firm B; 
￿  He has lent money to firm B; 
￿  He is liable for firm B’s debts; 
￿  None of the above; 
￿  Do not know. 
Which of the following statements is correct? 
￿  Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year; 
￿  Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds; 
￿  Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance; 
￿  None of the above; 
￿  Do not know. 
Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys a bond of firm B: 
￿  He owns a part of firm B; 
￿  He has lent money to firm B; 
￿  He is liable for firm B’s debts; 
￿  None of the above; 
￿  Do not know. 40 
Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset normally gives the highest 
return? 
￿  Savings accounts; 
￿  Bonds; 
￿  Stocks; 
￿  Do not know. 
Normally, which asset displays the highest fluctuations over time? 
￿  Savings accounts; 
￿  Bonds; 
￿  Stocks; 
￿  Do not know. 
When an investor spreads his money among different assets, does the risk of losing money: 
￿  Increase; 
￿  Decrease; 
￿  Stay the same; 
￿  Do not know. 